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Reading the report ‘The Digital Future of Mental Health-
care and its Workforce’ by the National Health Service
(NHS) from the United Kingdom makes for a strange
experience. Most centrally, it is utterly perplexing that no
single argument is mounted in the report to wave aside
accusations that it depicts a totalitarian world governed by
a digipsy‐complex. As it seems to presage the COVID crisis
in its assertion that digital mental health care will and
should be the future, this paper takes the pandemic as its
point of departure. However, it does not set out not from
the apparent digitalisation of psy‐care under COVID‐con-
ditions, but rather, from the psychologisation of the COVID
crisis itself; that is, individualising and pathologising the
discontents and socio‐subjective sufferings under COVID.
The aim is to tackle from here the intertwining of the
psychological and the digital, of psychologisation and digi-
talisation. This article engages in a close ‘symptomatic
reading’ of the report and makes two points. The first
concerns how digitalisation as such is closely connected to
the neurobiologisation of subjectivity. The second point is
about how digitalisation is also closely connected to the
commodification of all things subjective and social. After
discussing and interrelating these two issues, the article
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explores what a critical response could be, and what it
should not be.
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1 | INTRODUCTION: READING STRANGE REPORTS IN STRANGE TIMES
Reading the report ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce’ by the National Health Service
(NHS) from the United Kingdom makes for a strange experience. Or, in stronger terms, as James Barnes (2020),
writer and psychotherapist from Exeter, tweeted: it ‘makes for a VERY disturbing reading’. It made me ask: is this
really where the NHS people believe we should be heading? In what kind of world do we live in, or will we live in?
The report, one could argue, reads as a sci‐fi novella, with the reader torn between, on the one hand, the
assessment that the writing offers a predictable and therefore tedious dystopian vision, and, on the other hand, the
worry that this is not sci‐fi and that the report actually describes the gist of our current times.
The report is based on expert one‐to‐one interviews, expert focus groups, and ‘purposeful literature searches’,
and is prepared in support of the so‐called Topol Review, which aims at the ‘Preparing the healthcare workforce to
deliver the digital future’ (Topol, 2019) and which outlines recommendations
… to ensure the NHS is the world leader in using digital technologies to benefit patients. It will involve
implementing technologies such as genomics, digital medicine, artificial intelligence and robotics at a
faster pace and on a greater scale than anywhere else in the world.
Britannica will rule the digital (mental) health waves? Topol is not an acronym; as I learned, it refers to the
cardiologist, geneticist, and digital medicine researcher Dr Eric Topol who was commissioned to write a review
preparing the healthcare workforce to deliver the digital future. Topol (2019), introducing The Technology Review,
offers us a glimpse into the future, talking about how you, as a patient, would get
a warning on your wrist through your watch that your heart rhythm isn't right or you can get your
potassium in your blood through your watch (…) you can get your genome sequence then you can get
your gut microbiome sequence (…) there's so many ways to understand each human being like never
before.
But while Topol gets lyrical in his claim that digital technology could allow medicine to truly individualise and
particularise, a claim returning in full force in the report, I cannot but be reminded of the words of the Portuguese
novelist José Saramago (2008): ‘we will know less and less what is a human being’.
What adds to the disturbing potential and the element of strangeness of the report, published in February
2019, is that it seemed to presage the COVID crisis in its assertion that digital mental health care will and should be
the future. For especially in the first phases of the pandemic when, during worldwide lockdowns and quarantines,
counselling and psychotherapy were forced into exploring alternative ways of providing their services, it was the
digital technologies which imposed themselves as the obvious next best choice. This enforced digital turn was
heralded and eagerly embraced (Torous et al., 2020; Wind et al., 2020, p. 20), but equally bemoaned and criticised
(Tullio et al., 2020). However, it might be safely argued that the digitalisation of counselling and psychotherapy
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played right into the hands of official policies such as presented in the report ‘The Digital Future of Mental
Healthcare and its Workforce’, or, as in the title of an older NHS report: ‘The Future's Digital' (Cotton et al., 2014).
To get a first idea of the general direction after the pandemic, a quick glance on mental health related projects
funded by UKRI, a funding agency in the United Kingdom, under the umbrella of tackling the impact of COVID‐19 is
very instructive. Psy‐researchers are developing podcasts, videos, digital platforms, apps, to, for example, ‘help
children and families live happier lives in extraordinary times' and counter ‘worsening mental health as a result of
the COVID‐19 pandemic—for instance stress and anxiety disorders, depression, addictive behaviours, anger control
issues, eating disorders, psychosis and even PTSD' (UKRI, 2020). The ‘latest A.I. technology' or ‘an accurate inex-
pensive bluetooth sensor, which users can use at home (on their finger or wrist)' to measure their stress/anxiety
levels, are employed in all kind of projects that nudge users ‘to build healthier behaviours and resilience'. The
recurring argument is that the easy to use and cheap solutions offered by digital technologies ‘reduce the need for
in‐person check‐ups, and increase the efficiency of mental health care delivery generating significant savings to
providers and improving the patient experience' (UKRI, 2020).
However, in order to critically scrutinise ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce' report,
I aim to set out not from the apparent digitalisation of psy‐care under COVID‐conditions, but rather, from the
psychologisation of the COVID crisis itself. That is, what could be observed quite rapidly after the onset of the
pandemic was a highly psychologising approach to what is primarily a health crisis (e.g., stressing the need to
address psychological issues, announcing the ‘other pandemic' of anxiety and depression). To clarify from the onset,
I do not want to trivialise or dismiss the manifold manifestations of discontents and social and personal suffering,
but I want to question whether the individualising and pathologising approach of the mainstream psy‐experts—and
their tendency to pair their cardboardesque depictions of the good life with equally simplifying solutions (this is
what I mean here by psychologisation)—is not above all a trivialisation and hence a dismissal in itself of the social
and psychic misery that COVID brought us.
My methodological argument is that in order to understand the push to the digital in the ‘The Digital Future of
Mental Healthcare and its Workforce' report, it is expedient to start from a more broader critique of mainstream
psychology and its practices. And here, the first observation of the psychologisation of the COVID‐crisis is that it
was immediately linked to digitalisation. That is, while the pandemic served as an impetus to move more and more
things such as shopping, socialising, educating (etc.), to the online and virtual spheres (Klein, 2020), the psy‐experts
also urged us to seek shelter online, to use the digital means to connect with others so as to galvanise our mental
health and, if needed, to reach out for digital resources to seek help.
It is precisely this intertwining of the psychological and the digital, of psychologisation and digitalisation, that
I hope will be a fruitful way‐in to offer a critique of the ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce'
report. In the remainder of this paper, I will engage in a closer reading of the report and, more in particular, a
‘symptomatic reading',' the latter being theorised by, amongst others, Louis Althusser, as the methodology of a
Freudian‐like consideration of a theoretical discourse in its blind alleys (Althusser & Balibar, 1970). For Althusser,
the limits and fissures of theoretical discourses point to the presence of ideological elements, and this is where
theory opens up to the political (Althusser & Balibar, 1970). This method, looking for omissions, displacements and
repressions is, according to Nestor Braunstein (2020), particularly expedient when it concerns psy‐discourses, as he
invites us to attend to, within a text, the answers that are anticipated and the questions that are omitted.
Following the aforementioned method for closely scrutinising both the ‘The Digital Future of Mental Health-
care and its Workforce' report and the psychologising discourses related to the COVID‐19 crisis, there are two
points that I want to make. The first concerns how digitalisation as such is closely connected to the neuro-
biologisation of subjectivity; that is, to a reduction of all things subjective and social to biological issues, and how
this as such points to a fundamental and structural aporia within psychology. The second point is about how
digitalisation is also closely connected to the commodification of all things subjective and social. After discussing
and interrelating those two issues, I will explore what a critical response could be, and what it should not be.
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2 | NEUROBIOLOGISATION AS A CONDITION FOR DIGITALISATION
A cursory reading of the ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce' makes it clear that mental has
to be understood primarily as a medical and biological issue. Of course, one could argue, this is to be expected, as
the NHS is a government‐funded medical and health‐care service system, and so a strong focus on the somatic and
the bodily should come as no surprise. After the opening paragraph of the foreword of the report, where ‘the health
of the nation' (the biopolitical signifier par excellence) is proclaimed to vitally depend on ‘good mental health
services' (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 3), throughout the remainder of the text the future of this relationship is most
centrally situated in the coupling of the somatic to the technological. However, while the topics then covered
concern issues such as ‘telemedicine', ‘biomarkers,' ‘genome sequencing' (etc.), one is left waiting in vain for a
clarification or a justification of this sweeping move of equating the psychological, or the subjective, with the
biosomatic. If this refers to the questions that are omitted, to re‐use Braunstein's (2020) wordings here, what then
are the answers that are anticipated?
Here I argue that in order to digitalise mental health, a complete and wholesale biologisation and medical-
isation of the ‘mental' is the necessary, prior underlying assumption: that is, somatising subjectivity seems to be a
precondition for aligning it with silicon digitality. The whole rationale becomes clear in the following passage of the
report:
A biomarker is an objective indication (…) observed from outside the patient, which can be measured
accurately and reproducibly. In mental health, digital biomarkers are indicators of mental state that
can be derived through the patient's use of a digital technology. Commonly cited biomarkers cover
physiology (eg heart rate), cognition (eg screen use), behavioural (e.g., global positioning system) and
social (e.g., call frequency) (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 19).
In sum: reducing the subjective and all things human to measurable biomarkers allows and makes possible
datafication. Hence, medicalisation, biologisation, and neurologisation are the prime conditions for digitalisation.
‘An enhanced understanding of underlying pathology will become possible through technologies such as ge-
nomics and neuroimaging’ (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 28). If I may put it this way, the subjective—as the trou-
blesome, the tricky, the always evasive—is biologised in order to be fed into the computer: there, transferred to the
realm of the computationable, the ‘mental’ can finally be pinned downed and understood: these are the answers
that are anticipated.
Of course, one should not overlook how this rationale (biologising the psychological in order to digitalise it) is,
as such, based on the digital technologies stepping in at a prior stage. That is, it was precisely digital technologies
that made possible the neuro‐turn in the psy‐sciences. That the 90s of the previous century were announced as
‘The decade of the Brain' would not have been happened without the advent of digital imaging techniques allowing
us to chart the brain and to consider it as the fully mapped seat of our psyche. This is the double move: biologising
the subjective in order to digitalise it, and digitalising the neurobiological:
Technology seems likely to change our understanding of mental health. The major psychiatric dis-
orders, like depression and schizophrenia, appear to have many different genetic and environmental
causes. A new understanding of mental health/illness aided by digital phenotyping, genotyping and
neuroimaging will challenge current diagnoses and enable a more personalised approach to treatment
(Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 20).
Is this not where the subjective (and perhaps also the bodily?) is evacuated? The flag of personalisation is
waved, while, arguably, this is where the computated and the generalised cannot but generate particular models,
digital doubles or avatars, to which eventually the singular and the subjective (and the bodily?) has to succumb.
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But we need to add a further twist here: if the second part of my argument is that the reductionist neuro‐turn
itself is based on the reductionist move of bringing in digital technologies, then I still have to situate an even earlier
and more fundamental reductionism. That is, the use of digital technologies in, for example, neuroimaging, can be
said to be not psychology neutral: as I have discussed extensively elsewhere, if you want to do a fMRI study on, for
example, aggression, you need to start out from a particular understanding and hence from a psychological theory
on aggression. Clearly, it would make a wholesale difference if you set out from a cognitive‐behavioural conception
of aggression or a psychodynamic one. So, to put it in sharp terms I've used elsewhere: ‘it is psychology that is
mapped onto the brain, it is psychology that provides the pencils with which the brain is coloured' (De Vos, 2016,
p. 25). Or, put still differently, psychologisation (e.g., psychologising aggression), is the prime move: it is the claim
that we know what aggression is about, it is this answer omitting and silencing the questions, that underpins the
technologically propelled neuro‐turn.
But, in order to orientate ourselves in this potentially ‘hall of mirrors’ of the psycho‐neuro‐digi‐triad, let us turn
to the COVID‐crisis. For, the aforementioned psychologisation of the COVID‐crisis goes hand in hand with a
neurobiological framing of all things psychological and subjective. In my home country, the society of clinical
psychologists formed a ‘Psychology and Corona Expert group'. However, these experts only became officially
involved after first publicly demanding to be part of the governmental steering group that guided the exit from the
first quarantine, the so‐called GEES‐group which, hitherto, consisted of public health experts, economists, and
captains of industry. The psy–experts demanded a seat on the table arguing that their knowledge should be used to
steer the behaviour of the public; and to give their argument weight, in an open letter to the nation, they imme-
diately mentioned the brain as the key to understanding habits and behaviour and thus to changing (if not
manipulating, I would add) the latter (Psychology and Corona Expert Group, 2020).
We also need to look at the media where relating ‘the psychology of COVID’ to the brain is a recurrent theme.
Think, for example, of this article in The Guardian: ‘Has a year of living with Covid‐19 rewired our brains?' You can
find it on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/13/covid‐19‐rewired‐our‐brains‐pandemic‐mental‐
health. The reason why I write this URL in full is that it as such answers the question of the article: yes, ‘COVID‐19–
rewired‐our‐brains', further medicalising the socio‐subjective side of COVID by labelling it as a mental health
pandemic. A further straightforward answer along with corresponding directives can be found here: ‘Coronavirus:
the pandemic is changing our brains—here are the remedies’ (Sahakian et al., 2020) a popularised version, by the
authors themselves, of an academic paper (Vatansever et al., 2021). In the popularised version, the authors start out
by arguing that research suggests that the virus may gain access to the brain, and that this might explain (note in
passing that hard science seems to sit at ease with a lot of suggestive and tentative claims) symptoms of stress,
anxiety, and depression in patients who have contracted the virus. Then suddenly, the argument takes a big leap:
But it's not just people who have contracted the COVID‐19 virus that have suffered from increased
anxiety and depression during the pandemic. Excessive worry over contracting or spreading the virus
to other family members, as well as isolation and loneliness, can also change our brain chemistry
(Sahakian et al., 2020).
What is so striking here is the absence of any data, explanation, or argumentation: we might find here the true
meaning of a ‘missing link’, for there is as such no link provided! To make clear, again, my concern here is not to
contest the clearly massive social and subjective effects of the lockdown, leading to isolation and loneliness; rather,
to highlight (and question) how and why psychologising all this most rapidly leads to neurobiologising the effects of
the pandemic (and in this way the subjective itself). And as, if we follow a bit further the papers (both the pop-
ularised and academic) just mentioned, we see that the great leap is then followed by the shortcut that the
remedies for our current predicaments lie in the digital realm. Here we are led to the conclusion that it is precisely
the task of the digital to conceal or seal the big divide between the psychological and the neurological. That is, the
solutions proposed all concern brain training via digital devices: gaming, virtual reality solutions, wearable devices,
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telepsychiatry (Vatansever et al., 2021) all of which are suggested to have beneficial effects on the brain and thus
on our well‐being.
However, if, as said, one of the main messages of the psy‐experts on COVID was that we should counter so
called social distancing with the digital nearness of social media, one should not overlook that the psy‐experts often
voice the caveat that the digital is a good but not sufficient substitute for bodily contact. One the one hand we are
urged to go digital (see in this respect the American Red Cross (2020) advice to ‘connect with others through video
and phone calls, texts or social media). Talk with people you trust about your concerns and how you are feeling'. On
the other hand, there are warnings not to give children or adolescents unfettered access to screens or social media
(Unicef, 2020) or it is pointed out that digital socializing is still removed from the real thing:
…social media can never be a replacement for real‐world human connection. It requires in‐person
contact with others to trigger the hormones that alleviate stress and make you feel happier, healthier,
and more positive (Robinson & Smith, 2020).
Is this, in the end, still biologising argument, a defence of something beyond the digital that we should applaud
and endorse? Should we mount a resistance starting from the argument that there is something at the side of
(biological) life which resists and exceeds the digital? Perhaps not. But this is something to which I have to come
back to further on in this paper.
For the moment, let me foreground the coercive and mandatory aspect of the digital interpellation. In times of
the pandemic, we are urged from different sides to move all things subjective and intersubjective to the digital
realm. As the title of the already mentioned older NHS report runs: ‘The future's digital’. There seems to be no
alternative, and this receives a particular twist in the ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce'
report: ‘While engaging with services through digital technology will be something that patients can choose to do, it
will not be optional for the mental health workforce of the future’ (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 4).
This is clear, the professionals of the future will not be able to choose, make no mistake. However, the
disturbing question here is: would the ‘patients’ themselves truly still have the option to choose? In order to
answer this, let us consider a well‐known artificial intelligence therapy platform called Wysa. Wysa, launched in
2017, is claimed to promote and endorse ‘mental and emotional wellness’ and offers three pathways: an AI
chatbot, a library of evidence‐based self‐help tools, and messaging‐based support from human psychologists.
While in the latter option you can pay for video sessions with human therapists, the basic free plan is an app,
featuring an animated penguin that gives mental health exercises and tips (Garsd, 2020; Roxby, 2020). Does this
signal the options for patients in the digital future of mental healthcare? That is, if you can afford it then you can
pay for the human connection (albeit passing over digital channels); if not, you wind up with an infantile AI
cartoon! Or else, there is Woebot, ‘the friendly little bot, ready to listen, 24/7’ (Woebot Health, 2021). The silly
cartoon figure matches the name. Regarding the latter, did you get the pun? If not, just ask a toddler in your
neighbourhood to pronounce the word ‘robot’. (Or am I mistaken here, and does it contain a potentially racist
reference to Asian people?)
This infantilising fun factor keeps popping up when one delves deeper into the digital future of mental health.
Of course, this is closely connected to the fact that the digitalisation of counselling and psychotherapy is where the
next step towards commercialisation and commodification of subjectivity is taking us. Woebot Health (2021), for
example, founded in 2017 by a team of Stanford psychologists and AI experts, pitches its ‘product' as follows:
… new approaches are needed to meet the soaring global demand for accessible solutions that can
help people manage symptoms in the moment, and over a lifetime. (…) Digital products designed to
easily adapt to symptoms and severity, and deliver the right intervention to the right person at the
right time.
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Human discontents and suffering becomes an issue of demand and customised just‐in‐time supply, firmly
placing its ‘customers' in the same neo‐liberal framework: where they become themselves little entrepreneurs
managing their assets and liabilities. Woebot is free, up till now; nevertheless, their website includes a disclaimer
that the company may need to charge a fee in the future to achieve a sustainable business model (Eve, 2020). Yet
another example of commodification is Talkspace, which provides various forms of online therapy, and which
besides special offers also has gift cards available: ‘Offering someone a path to a happier life is more valuable than
any material gift. Send your friend or family member a Talkspace gift card'—I found this phrase of https://www.
talkspace.com/ a while ago, but I could not retrieve it when writing this paper. They are, however, still offering
giftcards. Imagine getting such a voucher at Christmas from a friend of a relative…
3 | THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIGITALISATION
That digitalisation is closely connected to the commodification of all things subjective and social is adamantly clear
in ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce’ report. If the first rationale of the report is the
neurobiologisation of mental health in order to make it computationable, then the second rationale is the neoliberal
scheme of efficiency geared towards aligning the mental, the subjective, and the social with the current digitalised
forms of political economic organisation, with what has been called ‘communicative capitalism’ (Dean, 2005),
‘surveillance capitalism' (Zuboff, 2019), or simply ‘digital capitalism' (amongst others: Fuchs & Mosco, 2015). The
key signifier in the ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce' report is ‘data’, which means that
which can be gathered via digital technologies so as to feed the algorithmic driven forms of digital mental
healthcare:
In the next 10 years, NLP [Natural Language Processing] technology may be able to analyse general
conversations within the home or work environment, then provide feedback to individuals on how
they could adapt their communication styles (such as expressed emotion) to help a patient or to
promote better general mental wellbeing (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 22).
Therefore, as the report speaks about ‘predictive mental health data’ (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 5), digital
mental health care needs to be understood as congruent with how, in the search for market domination and profit
maximalisation, ‘surveillance capitalists’, to use Soshana Zuboff's wordings, skim the digital world for ever‐more
predictive sources for the ‘behavioural futures market' (Zuboff, 2019, p. 8). Foley and Woollard (2019) formulate
the future of mental healthcare in the same terms of the data business model, putting forward that ‘phenotypic
information can be extracted from social media to aid the prediction and monitoring of mental health disorders'
(Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 5).
In the report, it is furthermore clear that in this move to a data‐driven psycho‐economy, the digital psy‐pundits
find their natural allies in those psy‐theories and models that understand the human precisely as an entrepreneur
managing assets and resources to sustain his/her mental health balance. This is what faces the mental health
‘workforce’ in the digital future: ‘(…) They will also have to help their own patients to run personal experiments,
using technology, to understand what works best for them’ (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 27).
The ‘patients’ thus are interpellated to be the data‐scientist or the data‐entrepreneur of themselves. Which is,
of course, a mere prolongation of what we are all now called upon to do: to gather data from our Fitbits or other
wearables, to analyse our run or bike courses via apps, with Google even offering a well‐being app that gives you a
daily view of how often you check your phone and how frequently you use different apps (see https://wellbeing.
google/). All this is believed to empower the subject, as it is stated in the report: ‘Patients in turn will have access to
their medical records and data, which they may choose to use with other online services' (Foley & Woollard, 2019,
p. 23).
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Arguably, this is a fake trade‐off: being the data‐scientist/entrepreneur of yourself amounts to doing the
control and the surveillance of yourself, if not simply, a form of voluntary servitude where one ‘freely’ chooses to
offer one's data to ‘other online services’. The issue here is not so much whether personal and sensitive data will be
shielded, or whether or not data will be sold to third parties: from the very moment (inter)subjectivity is datafied,
reification and alienation enter the fore and (inter)subjectivity is aligned with today's data capitalism. All of this, of
course, is sold as something good and emancipatory for the patients with Foley and Woollard (2019) claiming
‘[Digital technologies] will enable the realisation of personalised or precision psychiatry for individual patients and
will collectively amount to a Learning Mental Health System' (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 19).
The level of the use of newspeak in Foley and Woollard's (2019) report is at times astounding. For, if I am
allowed to make this association: does ‘precision psychiatry’ not bring into the mind the US president George W.
Bush using the wordings ‘precision bombing' in the Iraq wars? As it has been argued, the rhetorical use of ‘precision
bombing' aimed at giving a humane, clean, scientific and neutral picture of war (Deer, 2007). Arguably, the same
rhetorical ends are at stake in Foley and Woollard's report, as it is argued that data‐driven technologies are offering
precise and effective directions so as to target what needs to be targeted and how this should be done: ‘Eventually,
algorithms may be able to predict which clinician will most effectively treat a given patient’ (Foley & Wool-
lard, 2019, p. 29).
Here one should not miss the underlying argument: it is claimed that there is a ‘neutral’ technology, that there
are objective scientifically informed algorithmic models that can decide upon which kind of therapy is suited for a
particular person. Algorithms thus allegedly can adjudicate which approach, which kind of theory and which
therapeutic school would be indicated in certain cases. However, the primordial problem, of course, is that this
technology, these algorithmic models, are far from neutral on the level of the different theoretical models and
different therapeutic schools they presuppose. Clearly, from the very beginning, these decision models and heu-
ristics cannot but be filled with one or other psychological theory or framework. This is actually stated in the report
itself:
Effective behaviour change requires a theoretical framework for understanding the reasons why a
behaviour exists in the first place. It then requires evidence‐based interventions targeted on those
reasons. Such frameworks exist and must be baked into new technologies and the systems within
which they are deployed (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 31).
Literally: certain psychological frameworks are scripted into the technologies. So if, as stated, the digital
heuristic will be fed with the evidence based model (or with CBT models as in the case studies presented in the
report), of course one knows what will come out of those algorithmic assessments and predictions. Here the ‘there
is no alternative' message becomes a double edged sword: going digitally will not be optional, but theoretical
obedience to certain particular psychological models will be demanded: evidence based and CBT will be the offi-
cially and governmentally sanctioned models.
Here we encounter a specific instance of the aforementioned Althusserian argument: that in the limits and
fissures of theoretical discourses, the ideological and the political perspires. While I have first pointed to how a
close scrutiny of the digitalisation of mental health care exposes its alliance with the current political‐economic
model, this NHS report also testifies to how politics opens up to the theoretical. In other words, while in the cracks
of the psychological theories and practices the political arises, it is in the fissures of the political discourse and
practices that we more than often see a turn to the psychological. This is precisely what I argue is at stake in the
psychologisation of the COVID‐crisis.
To make the latter point clearer, let me start from the argument that the COVID‐crisis opened up a window to
at least reflect upon our political‐economical predicaments. This argument has been made by a whole range of
people and could perhaps be summarised in the title of a recent edited volume: ‘Everything Must Change! The
World After COVID‐19’ (Ávila & Horvat, 2020). To give the floor to just one voice:
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So it's a critical moment of human history, not just because of the coronavirus, that should bring us to
awareness of the profound flaws of the world, the deep, dysfunctional characteristics of the whole
socio‐economic system, which has to change, if there's going to be a survivable future (Noam
Chomsky cited in DiEM25 TV [2020]).
Is it not precisely here, at this political juncture and moment, that we have to situate the already discussed
psychologisation of the COVID crisis, as a way to escape or even a way to counter this political moment? As said,
shortly after the outbreak of the COVID crisis—while initially the debate was dominated by epidemiologists and
policy‐makers—the psy‐experts insinuated themselves into the debate. Was it a coincidence that the psycholog-
isation of our lives regained momentum precisely at the same time that the entrepreneurial world was asking
governments to urgently restart economic activities and to return to business as usual? It is as if the psychologists,
on hearing Chomsky et al.'s rejoinder (DiEM25 TV, 2020) that this is a political moment, we have to change the
socio‐economic system, predictably demurred: no, no it's the psychology (we have to fight anxiety and depression),
whilst whispering through their teeth: it's the economy (we've got to get the schools and the factories open).
Of course, the reader could object here, does this depiction not avoid complication or nuance, and moreover, is
this not offering an all too bleak vision? However, if I am allowed to answer this objection in this way, if you want to
avoid reading something blunt, offering not only a unidimensional if not cardboardesque depiction of the human
being but also a dark and dim glimpse into its future, then you should surely steer clear of the ‘The Digital Future of
Mental Healthcare and its Workforce' report.
4 | HOW (NOT) TO RESIST
Arguably, the report ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and its Workforce’—envisioning ‘automated treat-
ment’, ‘ingestible sensor technology’, ‘nanotechnology to deliver drugs directly to the brain’—paints an unsettling
vision of the surveillance society to come in which being disconnected is no longer an option. As such one wonders
why the people who have written this report have not undertaken any effort to ward off or counter the so obvious
and to be expected allegation that they are preparing for the ultimate surveillance society:
National data sets should contain data on every patient treated in mental healthcare services or in the
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme. Improved interfaces and visual-
isations can make this data more useful and accessible to policy makers, commissioners, providers,
clinicians and patients (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 6).
The assumption here is that ‘the human’ can be datafied, visualised, and interfaced, so that it eventually would
enable ‘limited automated treatment'. Notice that here, after all, some restraint is exhibited: it says ‘limited’…, but of
course, in the future this might go much further: ‘In the future, artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language
processing (NLP)‐enabled chatbots may facilitate more advanced automated or semi‐automated therapeutic tools’
(Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 5).
The first thing to ask here is, where does this leave the therapists and the counsellors? If psychotherapy is to be
a semi‐automated process, then, logically, therapists and the counsellors are subordinated to the algorithmic
computations. We read that clinicians ‘will be assisted by decision‐support technology’ (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p.
28), meaning the data itself will be gathered independently of the clinician, and that the future will see ‘the gen-
eration of predictive mental health data by non‐mental health services' and via other data sources: ‘Interaction with
the phone, such as clicks, finger movements, scrolls, locks and unlocks, notifications, charges, app usage, call and
SMS frequency, and calendar data, may all provide important indications of the patient's mental state' (Foley &
Woollard, 2019, p. 14). The digital is the ‘one ring to rule them all’:
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Effectively, the workforce may become a sensor network, initially recording text, then voice, and
eventually, even the staff's physiological indicators could drive predictive algorithms to identify
potential high‐risk or high‐cost events in inpatient or community settings (Foley & Woollard, 2019,
p. 25).
How not to understand this as ‘mental health 1984’? Again, it is utterly perplexing that no single word, no single
argument, is mounted to counter argue or wave aside accusations that this report depicts a totalitarian world
governed by a digipsy‐complex. At best, the report reduces ‘ethical aspects’ to issues of digital literacy and access to
digital technologies, or cultural issues involved in the latter:
These have the potential to greatly increase access, but there is a question mark around the impli-
cations for the therapeutic relationship. It is thought that such systems could be adapted to be more
culturally appropriate to sections of society that currently find it anxiety provoking to engage (Foley
& Woollard, 2019, p. 21).
In no single instance do the authors of this report stop to wonder if their digital future itself would not provoke
anxiety and a reluctance, or perhaps even resistance, to engage with Big Psy who is not only watching all of us but
would even be capable to probing what we think and what we feel: ‘NLP applications may be able to first transcribe
conversations, then later to understand the sentiment of participants within a conversation, and eventually sum-
marise conversations automatically’ (Foley & Woollard, 2019, p. 17).
And if you would have doubts that the digital would miss out on ‘non‐verbal' communication, not only on the
level of understanding it but also on the level of using it itself, make no mistake, for that will be taken care of too in
the nearby future: ‘As communication develops across new modalities, for example, through shared VR, there will
be new possibilities for richer communication at a distance, utilising a broader range of senses, such as touch’ (Foley
& Woollard, 2019, p. 26).
So the argument mentioned above that there would be some aspect of the biological and bodily life that would
exceed and resist the digital (the idea that ‘real' in‐person contact with others triggers stress alleviating hormones
which the digital way of connecting could never replace) is here already countered: VR and haptic devices will do
pretty good and once we can connect brains directly to the computer and with each other (see Elon Musk's project
Neuralink, and for a critique, see De Vos, 2020) we will be totally covered.
Is this what the future of digital therapy will be about—giving hugs, pats on the shoulder via VR? Will Wysa and
Woebot wrap their blue and brown cartoon arms around us so that we, via a direct cortical connection, feel their
algorithmic warmth. Yak! The horror! I know, this is getting ridiculous; reading my own last sentences, I would be
tempted to dismiss the Foley and Woollard report and similar discourses as, to reuse the terms of my introduction,
an all too predictable and therefore tedious dystopian vision. But here, I cannot but again turn to my favourite
Hannah Arendt (1958) quote:
The trouble with modern theories of behaviorism is not that they are wrong but that they could
become true, that they actually are the best possible conceptualization of certain obvious trends in
modern society. It is quite conceivable that the modern age–which began with such an unprecedented
and promising outburst of human activity may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has
ever known (Arendt, 1958, p. 322).
Hence, in the same way, the prime problem with reports such as ‘The Digital Future of Mental Healthcare and
its Workforce’ is that they would become true; that their tedious, stereotypic or even cartoonesque vision of the
future is actually an accurate conceptualisation of certain obvious trends of our times and will, in one way or
another, become reality. For the time being, this reality is ‘becoming' in forms that we critics might judge as rather
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ludicrous and innocent (e.g., in the form that well‐being bots will let the control pad in your hands slightly vibrate
when the algorithms, underpinned by the mainstream psychotherapeutic models, would decide you need a
compassionate and empathic response so that you would feel that you are being understood). But we should make
no mistake here: other and more far‐reaching technological features will be arriving further down the line. Nor
should we under‐estimate the power of interpellation, as illustrated via reports such as the NHS Foley and
Woollard review but also via the websites and other channels of private corporations offering digital therapy,
where professionals and laypersons alike are drawn into this discourse and it rhetorics, which, to be clear, will only
be judged as ‘VERY disturbing’ by some and not by all.
What should our resistance be here: to shield or withhold our data, or to claim that the human, the subjective,
the mental, the psychological is in the end not datafiable? That it needs a human to understand another human?
Yes, but no! Instead of contesting the possibility of AI understanding the human (see the quote above mentioning
how NLP would be able to ‘understand the sentiment of participants within a conversation’), perhaps we should in
the first place assert that what we are deprived of here is, rather, the non‐understanding that might be charac-
teristic of personal and interpersonal matters, and, added to this, the confused feelings, if not the absence of
feelings…, and, for that matter, not the hugs, but rather our discontents with touch, or our melancholia as each
touch or bodily contact always already was never enough.
Our defence should therefore not be: the digital cannot fully capture all the things ‘we know’ as typically
human. Rather, we should argue, in psychodigitalisation, we are enforced and interpellated to take upon us the
cardboardesque models of the unidimensional homo psychologicus of the mainstream psychological theories and
models. Here, we are precisely robbed of our not knowing what our being human is about.
The latter is precisely at stake in the psychologisation of the COVID‐crisis: the COVID psychologists argue: we
know what COVID does with you, it makes you anxious and depressed. So go online, it will be taken care of. Do not
isolate. This is precisely what social media always was about: it most coercively demands our presence: ‘Tell your
friends what you are doing’; and it does this obviously in a psychologising mode: ‘tell your friends what you are
thinking and how you feel’. We are robbed of our not‐thinking, from our not knowing how we feel, if not from our
not‐feeling. Our little absences have to be turned into full emotional presences. And the latter are steered and pre‐
configured by algorithms that are based on the mainstream psychological models of presence and emotions.
Of course, as said, I do not contest that people have massively suffered from COVID and the lockdown; we do,
we all experience personal, or better social‐subjective, problems due to the pandemic. But here I want to lean on
Christopher Lasch's (1978) words: therapeutisation is not about ‘diverting attention from social problems to
personal ones, from real issues to false issues, but [about] obscuring the social origins of the suffering' (Lasch, 1978,
p. 30). In other words, what we need to contest is psychologisation processes that obscure how the personal (and
the discontents and the suffering) is as such a social and a political‐economic issue.
The psychology section of the Belgian Red Cross (2020) has just launched a COVID related app to incite people
to take care of each other: ‘if you see someone who someone who doesn't believe our shared stories, who evades
crowds, and is critical about everything… then the app “Handhold” can help you help'. I must say, I feel personally
targeted. Is this the mobilisation of a thought police, a well‐being police to make us comply with the general story,
to join the crowd and be no longer critical?
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